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Policy Options for German Future Government
Berlin – Moscow 2005 - 2008
The year 1999, marked by the NATO war in Kosovo as 
well as the second war in Chechnya, lead to considera-
ble dissonance in the Berlin - Moscow relationship. Yet 
in early 2000, the new Chancellor was driven towards 
Russia by the leading captains of the German econo-
my. Today Russia is largely economically rehabilitated, 
and its domestic policies are consolidated, but less 
democratic. Assistance for Russia as in the manner of 
the 1990’s is superfluous, however, there remains a 
factional dispute about whether it is sensible or coun-
terproductive for pan- European stability to engage in 
a strategic partnership with an economically attrac-
tive, but authoritarian Russia.
Thanks to Schroeder, Russia will assume the head of 
the G-8 in 2006, in Germany’s place. Russian member-
ship to the WTO is set to take place in the same year.  
Moscow is hoping for German support for its interna-
tional agenda. In the past two years, Schroeder’s 
friendship with Vladimir Putin appears to have paid 
dividends, especially for the economy. While the US, 
in the wake of the Yukos affair and the conflict over 
the Iraq war, has practically pulled out of the energy 
dialogue and the antiterrorism coalition with Russia, 
German corporations have been able to gain strategic 
advantages in the Russian market. 
In 2007, Russians will vote for a new parliament. If the 
liberal parties miss their opportunity to return to the 
Duma, one can assume that the current authoritarian 
course will continue. The election of Putin‘s successor 
will be of even greater significance. Will the new pres-
ident, to be elected in the beginning of 2008, use the 
power of the ‘Putin System’ to finally modernise and 
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CISbarometer
On the occasion of the OSCE‘s 30th anniversary, Wolfgang Gerhardt,  
candidate for the post of Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in a possible 
CDU/CSU/FDP government, advocated strengthening the role of this 
important European institution.
After the Bundestag elections on the 18th of Septem-
ber, a new Federal Government could be inclined to 
distance itself from the current ‘special’ and ‘strategic’ 
relationship between Berlin and Moscow, and increas-
ingly engage with the smaller Central and Eastern 
European states. On the other hand, it can be expected 
that the undeniable economic boom in Russia will 
continue to hold German companies in its spell, and 
politics will follow the strategic interests of the Ger-
man economy. 
Berlin and Moscow are faced with several problems 
that must be overcome in the next three years. In 1998 
Gerhard Schroeder inherited a Russia policy from Hel-
mut Kohl, which was still targeted at preventing chaos 
in Russia and sustaining the Russian economy from its 
threatened collapse. 
reform the country? Due to the prevailing power con-
stellations, suspicions are surfacing that Putin’s suc-
cessor will again come from within the secret service. 
In the same year, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement signed in 1994 between Russia and the EU, 
is set to expire.  Today it still defines the strategic rela-
tionships between both European powers. The EU is 
presently Russia’s biggest foreign trade partner. In 
light of the stiff posturing from the new EU members, 
some of whom are even demanding a policy of con-
tainment towards Russia rather than a partnership, 
the gap between the EU and Russia could grow wider. 
Romania and Bulgaria joining the EU could increase 
the ranks of Russia critics. The question of NATO’s 
third round of Eastern expansion (Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan) could become relevant 
already in 2007.
German politics under Kohl and Schroeder managed 
to assuage the Kremlin during difficult times and tem-
per problems, as exemplified during the Kosovo war or 
the Ukraine crisis at the end of 2004. In the end of 
each dispute with the West, whether concerning tran-
sit to Kaliningrad, the Russian drive for hegemony in 
the CIS, NATO and EU expansion, the Kyoto Protocol, 
or support for Iran’s nuclear programme, Yeltsin and 
Putin always found their way back to a policy of inte-
gration with the West.  How can this subtle exertion 
of influence on the Kremlin be maintained after 
2008?
Differences Schroeder – Merkel
In the German media there has been speculation  
that for Schroeder, relations with Russia are primarily 
about business.  For oil and gas he is said to be shut-
ting his eyes to Putin’s authoritarian policies. What 
really counts for Schroeder, however, is Putin’s 
achievement of having rescued Russia from chaos.  
Western democracy and civil society are hardly likely 
to establish themselves in Russia from one day to the 
next, due to the country’s traditions and different  
historical ‘time frame’.
Although economic relations were the dominant ones 
in German – Russian dealings of the past years, they 
gained an additional security policy dimension under 
Schroeder and Putin. After NATO and the EU integrat-
ed the Central and Eastern European countries, the 
German government inevitably had to set its sights on 
stabilising an expanded Europe. The energy alliance 
with Russia was to play a similarly binding role as  
did the European Coal and Steel Community between 
Germany and France after the Second World War. The 
Troika meetings between Germany, France and Russia 
were not meant to create an anti- American ‘axis’, but 
instead provide a temporary informal structure for 
integrating Russia into the West and bringing about 
agreements between the EU and Russia on other geo-
political issues. This initiative was meant to grant Rus-
sia a minimum say in the pan- European architecture, 
because Russia is excluded from decision-making bod-
ies such as NATO and the EU. Even the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe are more concerned with transfer-
ring democracy to the East instead of thinking about 
how one could utilise this historic opportunity to 
build the Europe of the 21st century together with 
Russia.  
If Schroeder stays, there will be no change of course in 
his relations towards Russia. However, a CDU/CSU/FDP 
government will want to set different priorities in its 
eastern policies. For the Black-Yellow coalition, playing 
a specific lawyer-role for Russia in the West appears to 
be less about fulfilling national interests than about 
looking back to the traditional German leadership role 
in finding consensus and balancing interests between 
large and small nations in Europe. The way the Kohl 
administration led the Central and East Europeans to 
NATO and the EU is a case in point. Even the CDU lead-
ership, which was having discussions with Russian 
politicians at the 131st Bergedorfer Roundtables in 
Potsdam at the end of June, emphasised that it was 
only in this role that Germany could reclaim its func-
tion as a motor for European integration. Instead of a 
partnership based solely on interest, which shuts its 
eyes before Russia’s democratic deficits, the degree of 
future relations is to be determined by the extent to 
which Russia will move closer towards western liberal 
values. 
From the perspective of the CDU/CSU/FDP the build-
ing of the Berlin-Moscow-Paris axis, which was created 
in the wake of the Iraq crisis in 2003, has split the EU 
and damaged transatlantic relations. The opposition is 
demanding a fundamental repair of ‘transatlanticism’ 
and the rejection of any sort of ‘Eurasianism.’ A gov-
ernment under Angela Merkel plans to increasingly 
align its future policy towards the East with Poland 
rather than France.  The German – French – Russian 
troika would be replaced by a German – Polish – Rus-
sian one, while the further continuation of the energy 
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alliance with Russia would take into account the inter-
ests of Central and Eastern European transit countries 
more than previously.
Options for Action
Germany is no world power; it can draw its interna-
tional weight only from the integrated power of 
Europe. It appears more promising to work with the 
US superpower and the new Central and Eastern  
European EU member states on strengthening the 
West, rather than trying to establish a multi-polar 
world order with the previous world powers France 
and Russia against American interests. 
One of the German government’s important foreign 
policy tasks will be to stabilise the strategic neigh-
bourhood of the EU. The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy is 
far from maturing. Even now the Europeans are argu-
ing with each other, whether to concentrate their com-
mon European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on North 
Africa, the Middle East or on the post-Soviet space.  
Russia is the most difficult factor for the ENP, for a 
peaceful European order in the 21st century hinges  
on a successful democratic transformation of Russia. 
An important element of German policy towards the 
East and the ENP of the EU remains the energy alli-
ance with Russia and other successor states of the 
former Soviet Union. In the face of threatening insta-
bility in the Persian Gulf it recommends itself. 
Through cooperation in the energy sector, in the long-
term a common Euro-Eurasian economic area can be 
created, which would strengthen the West’s energy 
security, interlink economic structures in the East and 
West and expand investment opportunities on both 
sides.  In order to use energy politics to set the pan-
European union on the right track, Germany must 
guarantee that the Central and Eastern European 
countries as well as the Ukraine and Georgia be inte-
grated into the larger energy alliance and in future 
energy consortia as equal partners and reliable transit 
countries.
The Federal Republic of Germany, in the spirit of 
strengthening the European Security and Defense Pol-
icy (ESDP), could support rapprochement between Rus-
sia and the Central and Eastern European states.  
Germany and the states of the ‘old’ West historically 
reconciled with Russia after the fall of the wall and 
began a strategic partnership. The former Warsaw Pact 
states reunited with the historical Europe and enjoy 
the protection of the US. Many of these new EU mem-
ber states have however not yet reconciled with Russia, 
as political disputes remain unresolved. German for-
eign policy should not let itself be subject to one-sided 
interests, which could consequently lead to Russia’s 
further self-isolation. The EU must find a unified and 
constructive agenda for Russia, otherwise Russia’s 
future relations with the West will run on bilateral 
tracks even more than they do now. This does not 
mean that the German government should not do 
more to dismantle Central and Eastern European fears 
of a German-Russian axis. 
Naturally the partnership with Russia depends sub-
stantially on Moscow’s will to continue its rapproche-
ment with the West, and orient itself according to the 
EU’s understandings of values and justice. At a confer-
ence of leading German Russia specialists, organised 
recently by the Hanns-Seidel Foundation in Wildbad 
Kreuth, the majority held the opinion that the system 
of ‘guided’ democracy that was established six years 
ago is likely to get stronger even after 2007/2008. In 
the strategically important industry and natural 
resource branches, state guided holdings would be  
created, which should be increasingly targeted at the 
national interest. The economy would not be further 
liberalised by this, but there would be no signs of an 
economic crisis and consequent political upheaval 
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The civil society dialogue between Russia and Germany is being carried 
out permanently and ambitiously at all levels, particularly in Berlin. 
Smaller dialogue formats are serving to support the yearly Petersburg 
Dialogue. 
that could change the power constellation in Moscow, 
as there has been in the Ukraine and in Georgia.
 
So the tension in Russia between positive economic 
development and the lack of a civil society will remain 
in the following years. Providing a remedy for this 
could become a long-term goal of future German  
Russia policy. An instrument for this is the Petersburg 
Dialogue, which is putting its hopes foremost on the 
younger generations, who are now taking their place 
in society. The fundamental problem is that the  
Russian leadership in its paranoia is viewing the  
revolutions that took place in the post-Soviet space as a 
western conspiracy, and would like to deny their own 
NGO’s all support from the West. 
Furthermore it is to be recommended to the German 
government, to do more to ensure that the post-Soviet 
space does not become a new conflict hotbed. Coun-
tries
such as the Ukraine and Russia should not be separate-
ly divided, but rather both should be kept in parallel 
on a western course.  The revolutions in Georgia, the 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have not really led to more 
democracy, and there is still a lot that needs to be 
done to aid these transformation processes.
Democratic changes in Belarus can probably only  
be effected with Russia. If Russia falls back into  
totalitarian structures, then Germany and the EU 
must at least save the other countries of the strategic 
eastern neighbourhood from instability. That is why to 
begin with, a stronger concentrated effort to transfer 
democracy to Eurasia beyond previous European 
efforts would be advisable.
There are numerous possible fields for cooperation 
through which western opportunities for influence in 
transferring democracy and values to the post-Soviet 
space could be strengthened and further strategic 
partnerships initiated. Some examples would be fight-
ing poverty together within the G-8 framework, joint 
peace missions in the Caucasus, western reconstruc-
tion aid for Chechnya, regional cooperation to tackle 
water supply in the Caspian area, the consolidation of 
the NATO-Russia council, joint prevention of Islamic 
terrorism in Central Asia (as Moscow is supporting the 
German-French peace mission in Afghanistan and the 
EU could definitely strive for observer status in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization), mutual help in 
the fight against international crime, illegal migration 
and drug trafficking, cooperation in the high technol-
ogy and aircraft industry sector as well as with natu-
ral disasters and accidents (as recently occurred with 
the rescue of the Russian submarine off Kamchatka).
Finally, the Russia policy of a new German govern-
ment will be marked by sober realities. The German 
economy will not let the perspective of conquering 
one of the biggest growth markets of the 21st century 
in Russia, be taken away. The economy does not want 
to wait too long until Russia adopts western values, in 
order to become active on the Russian market. Ger-
man economic interests will be covered by the states 
within which mighty CDU Prime Ministers reign. Yet 
without political support from Berlin, the German 
economy will hardly be able to achieve its goals in 
present-day Russia, where state power has again taken 
over control over the most strategically important 
industry branches.
Alexander Rahr
September 2005 | Page 4
Experts from Russia and Germany present their strategy paper to a broad 
audience in Berlin.
The Petersburg Dialogue’s “Workshop on the Future” 
would like to pick out as a central theme the long-term 
challenge of Europe’s demographic crisis and promote 
the working out of joint solutions for Russia and 
Germany. The contribution consists first of all in an 
analysis of the demographic situation in Germany and 
Russia. It will sound out whether there might be joint 
problem solving opportunities, which could be applied 
not just in content but organisationally, for example 
through joint work including the respective partners 
in the relevant international and inter-governmental 
organisations. The Russian G-8 Presidency in 2006 will 
provide a fitting opportunity for this.
Demographic development belongs to the global chal-
lenges of the 21st century. Parts of populations will 
completely change. While there is a population boom 
in Asia, Europe is experiencing a decline in popula-
tion. Russia (including its Asian part) is in this tenden-
cy undoubtedly part of the European trend. In twenty 
years, there will be twenty million less people living 
in Russia. According to estimates of UN experts, the 
population of Russia could even shrink to around half 
of the current 145 million people by the end of the 
21st century. Less than one percent of the world’s pop-
ulation would then reside in the world’s largest coun-
try by surface area.
The particular drama of Russian development in com-
parison with that of other European countries is given 
expression in the high death rate. In 26 out of 89 
regions of the Russian Federation three times as many 
people are dying than being born. In 2002 (2.3 mil-
lion), the death rate was 50 percent above the one of 
1987 (1.5 million). In addition to that comes the drama 
of social and health policies, which point to continu-
ing Soviet inheritance and completely insufficient 
social and health policies. Abortions, sexually trans-
mitted diseases and alcohol abuse are frightening con-
sequences of the population’s social and moral decline.
Germany is also faced- ceteris paribus- by a dramatic 
demographic development: if the current birth rate 
and low immigration remain the same, then the 82 
II. Strategy paper of the Petersburg Dialogue’s “Workshop on the Future”
Germany and Russia facing  
demographic challenges
million of 2000 will decrease to 65 million in 2050. 
The influx of immigrants (600, 000) is countered by 
547, 000 people emigrating from Germany (2004). The 
migration surplus is steadily decreasing. Even the 
influx of immigrants of German origin from Eastern 
European states will not be a significant force in the 
foreseeable future anymore (2004: 50,000). However, 
not only the change in absolute number of inhabitants 
will play a role for both states, but also their domestic 
distribution.
The demographic issue touches on a variety of domes-
tic policy themes, including family policy, infrastruc-
ture and business development, health, environment, 
finance, tax and even defense policy. 
Aspects of the demographic challenge
In Germany, low birth rates and an immigration poli-
cy which is not viable are leading to a decrease in and 
ageing of the population. This long-term development 
is flanked by population movements: economically 
induced migration movements within Germany are 
augmenting social differences and creating further 
conflict potentials, which could find their expression 
in the popularity of extremist parties. For example, a 
population decrease in over 20 percent by 2020 is fore-
cast in administrative districts in northeast and cen-
tral Germany. Although billions are invested in the 
strengthening of infrastructure and business develop-
ment, the structurally disadvantaged East is especially 
prone to emigration and high levels of unemployment. 
At the same time, there are regions such as Weimar, 
within which the trend of emigration and population 
decline have been halted and even reversed.
In Russia, one can observe populations migrating from 
the flat, rural parts of the country to the urban areas. 
Migration in Russia is particularly affecting those 
areas that are, as in the case of Germany, marked by 
unemployment and repercussions of bad infrastruc-
ture (such as supply problems).  Formerly strategically 
important regions in northern Russia and in Siberia 
are suffering from a dilapidation of infrastructure. 
Recently, President Putin has pointed out that the 
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withdrawal of ethnic Russians from the North Cauca-
sus is posing a problem for the entire nation. Moreo-
ver, many Russian citizens have left the country since 
1991, among them over a million well-educated Rus-
sian Jews. This resulted in a loss of workforce in 
research, education and medicine. In addition, Russia 
is, like Germany, affected by a low birth rate. However, 
while in Germany life expectancy is increasing, Russia 
must tackle the problem of a low life expectancy due 
to medical and social challenges, especially amongst 
men.
These demographic challenges of Germany and Russia 
are leading to a series of economic, social and security 
implications.  While for Russia, due to its territorial 
size, above all a quantitative aspect will come in use-
ful (securing the social and governmental structures 
in the rural areas), a qualitative aspect seems more 
important for Germany (securing the social security 
net and the supply of qualified employees). Yet in Ger-
many economically less developed regions are also fac-
ing great challenges. Due to its small size, compared 
to Russia, and the good quality of existing infrastruc-
ture, these developments should not be of much conse-
quence here.
Due to its declining population, Russia is threatened 
with a crisis of defensive capabilities. The population 
group of 15-24 year olds will decrease in the next 
twenty years by 2025 by 45 percent. The number of 
those fit for military service will dramatically 
decrease. Compared to that, what Germany is expect-
ing is rather unspectacular. At most, the change in 
population numbers could have repercussions on 
majority decisions of the EU, which are made accord-
ing to population size. Also, in the case of sinking 
GDPs caused by demographic factors, the influence of 
Russia and Germany in international organizations 
(OSCE, UN) could wane, as their budgets are orientated 
according to economic strength of member states.
Changing demographic capacities do not remain with-
out economic consequences. Russia’s share of the 
world population will go back from 2,4 percent (2000) 
to 1,6 percent by 2025. The economic consequences are 
particularly dramatic for Russia. Yet danger is also 
lurking for Russia’s trade partners. Russia is the recipi-
ent of comprehensive German investments and an 
important market for Russian products. The stability 
and possible expansion of this market are in the Ger-
man interest. Regarding the investments, German 
businesses are keen that the situation in Russia 
remains favourable. 
That includes sufficient infrastructure and normal 
social surroundings at the location of German invest-
ments, even in remote areas. What counts above all in 
the conditions for success, however, is a qualified 
workforce and appropriate state structures. Yet with 
demographic fluctuations and the resulting adjust-
ments of state activity, all these points are subject to 
changes. Already now the cost-benefit conditions of 
investments in the education of a skilled worker in 
Russia are distorted, when you consider that a twenty 
year old only has a 46 percent chance of reaching the 
retirement age of 65, while in the US a twenty year old 
has a 79 percent chance of reaching it. While the 
number of 15-24 year olds was 10-12 million between 
1975 and 2000, in 2025 they will only account for 6 
million. Herein lie the long-term consequences for the 
maintenance of economic power. Germany on the 
other hand will remain an important economic part-
ner for Russia only if it manages to maintain its level 
of scientific-technical expertise and does not - due to 
high costs for social services and lacking reforms- lag 
further behind in international comparison. Because 
the demographic challenge in Germany can influence 
innovation capabilities and economic activity in the 
country, what is needed is to find solutions in the 
interest of both sides.
The population movements in Russia and in Germany 
led on the whole to a population decline in the periph-
eral areas. In both the destination as well as in the 
departure areas this leads to social problems. The des-
tination areas, mostly large cities, must make living 
space available for the population arriving. Often they 
are poorer people. In addition, in Russia there is the 
problem of the different ethnic groups. The destina-
tion areas must ensure the integration of the popula-
tion influx and prevent its ghettoisation. The areas 
that are being left behind are being more and more 
depopulated. What is especially problematic is that 
particularly young persons are moving away from 
these areas. Economically these regions are becoming 
increasingly unattractive, due to the lack of a well-edu-
cated, young workforce. Finally businesses are moving 
out as well, which drives even more young people to 
leave. A worrying cycle is created. Whole regions of 
Russia are threatened with depopulation, if the cur-
rent tendencies continue. In the Far East of Russia, 
with a population density of 7 million people on 2,4 
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million km2 there already is a kind of ‘demographic 
vacuum’. The threat scenarios of people flooding in 
from China seem to remain a myth for the time being. 
Attempts at a solution
President Putin has described the demographic situa-
tion of his country as an approaching catastrophe.  In 
fact, this issue is considered amongst the priorities of 
Russian domestic policy. The first legislative regula-
tions for immigration have been put in place, but they 
do not suffice. For a long time ideological obstructions 
predominated which wanted to make the world 
believe that the HIV/AIDS epidemic would stop at the 
Russian borders. Critics of German social policy are 
pointing out that the previous incentives to raise the 
birth rate are not good enough. In Russia as well 
attempts so far have been insufficient. Attempts at 
solving the demographic challenge should be subdivid-
ed into internal reforms, joint interstate work and 
international initiatives.
In principle, there are two attempts to counter the 
demographic problem: raising the birth rate through 
state incentives or more immigration. Raising the 
birth rate through state incentives includes promoting 
it with child benefit, creating child care facilities, tax 
advantages for families, investments in the education 
system, parental time regulations, making it easier for 
mothers to come back to work etc. In addition, for  
Russia it is an important task to altogether modernise 
the state, which includes restructuring social policies. 
Important reforms have been initiated, partly against 
strong protest of the population. Only in a secured 
social environment does the willingness to start a 
family increase.
As a promising measure to solve the demographic 
challenge in Germany, it is usually proposed to effect 
a change in immigration policies. In this context, it 
can be observed that both in Germany as well as in 
Russia, immigration is being handled restrictively. A 
change on the basis of the domestic atmosphere can 
only be expected to a limited degree, until changing 
values of coming generations might provide possibili-
ties for progress. 
However, immigration poses new problems for society. 
Immigrants must be integrated into the society. More-
over, Germany and Russia are only attractive as immi-
gration destinations, if they can offer immigrants an 
improvement of their situation.  In the competition 
for immigrants Germany and Russia must compete 
with much more open, economically competitive and 
innovative societies. Investments in education, 
research and innovation are thus necessary. Further-
more, basic legal conditions must also be adapted to 
the society. It is about the recognition of foreign quali-
fications, the possibility for foreigners to acquire prop-
erty and possibly start businesses, and acquire the Ger-
man or Russian citizenship.
The “Workshop on the Future” is convinced that Ger-
many and Russia, because of their common attribute 
of being states with limited immigration policies, can 
look for solution models together. The German welfare 
state is cost-intensive and can only survive in a glo-
balised world if similar standards exist in other coun-
tries. Solving the demographic problem in Russia and 
the parallel construction of a Russian welfare state 
thus pose great incentives for German politics to act 
upon. Russian interest is in the adoption of Germany’s 
experiences in reforming the social sector. What goes 
for Germany in relation to Russia, goes likewise for 
Germany and Russian together and for the globalised 
world. In order to maintain current social levels, Rus-
sia and Germany should support reforms and higher 
living standards in the poorer countries in their 
neighbourhood. The G-8 as the relevant international 
organisation provides an appropriate framework for 
this.
Authors of the “Workshop on the Future”:
Wolfgang Sender (German Bundestag), Pamela Preusche 
(Federal Foreign Office), Dr. Rainer Lindner (Foundation for  
Science and Policy)
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Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was greeted in the West 
for three reasons. Firstly, the second-largest state of the 
former Soviet Union proved that democracy can indeed 
be fought for by the people in the post-Soviet region. 
Secondly, the EU demonstrated through its exertion of 
influence on developments in Kiev, that it was able to 
effectively implement a common foreign and security 
policy. Thirdly, the attempt by Russia to bring the post-
Soviet space under control through a union with 
Ukraine was brought to a halt once and for all.
Ten months afterwards, the first two aspects of the 
Revolution have not lead to any results. Economically, 
the country is in decline with the growth rate having 
sunk from 12 to 4 percent.  The Ukraine is far removed 
from a genuine market economy and a liberal judicial 
system. Economic policy is being steered by the govern-
ment with the same old administrative methods and 
the people are being given token populist presents. The 
battle against the old oligarchs is reminiscent of the 
Putin regime’s irregularities. There are hardly any wes-
tern investors. The Ukraine is likewise far from politi-
cal stability. In October a power shift from the Executi-
ve to the Legislative will occur. Then parliamentary 
elections will take place. If one considers that even in 
the third round of voting in the December 2004 presi-
dential elections, 44 percent voted against Victor Yush-
chenko, it is possible that left-wing and other non-libe-
ral parties might be able to effect revenge. A foretaste 
of this was provided by the current parliament’s rejec-
tion of legislation necessary for the Ukraine to join the 
WTO.
Whether the Ukraine will in fact be able to sever its 
ties to Russia remains to be seen. Russian investments 
in the Ukraine’s strategic industry branches have 
rather increased. Yushtchenko and his former Prime 
Minister Yulia Timoshenko were trying hard to dis-
tance themselves from Russia’s energy dependencies 
and even build up an alternative energy alliance with 
the West without Russia. In order to achieve this goal, 
Kiev is in intensive discussions with Turkmenistan, 
Iran and Turkey. Ukrainian oil refineries are to be 
constructed from scratch and ambitious pipeline pro-
jects, politically supported by Poland, Romania and the 
Baltic states are to be offered to the West. With regard 
to Russia, the Ukraine is on the brink of a dangerous 
conflict. First Timoshenko tried to force Russian oil 
companies, who have long bought into the Ukrainian 
oil sector, to lower their prices, albeit unsuccessfully. 
Kiev also had to give way in the fight over the disappe-
ared 8 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas, 
which was unlawfully stored in Ukrainian silos on the 
transport route to the West.  
With the exception of Poland, the EU is hardly sho-
wing any interest in the Ukraine. It is overburdened 
with its own problems after the failure of the EU Con-
stitution. The Ukraine has not been offered neither the 
status of a free market economy, nor an affiliated 
membership in the EU, and certainly not any prospect 
of joining the EU. The Ukrainian leadership has repea-
ted the old mistakes and has in its further reform pro-
cess fatalistically only relied on western help and the 
unrealistic prospect of joining the EU. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy should engage with the Ukraine 
as soon as possible. The country is threatened with 
power struggles, reform standstill, corruption and 
nepotism. Coincidentally, the situation in Georgia after 
the Rose Revolution is similarly disappointing. In Cen-
tral Asia meanwhile Russia and China now want to 
work together to prevent further revolutions and 
coups. If the Ukraine is not offered prospects of joining 
the EU, it will increasingly push for membership in 
NATO.
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Yulia Timoshenko rose to power through oil deals with Russia in the 1990s. 
Since she became a politician, she has been fighting for a radical diversifi-
cation of Russian energy transports to the West.
